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Why Stay Together? State Nationalism and Justifications for State Unity in Spain 
and the UK 
This paper examines the way party elites in the UK and Spain discursively 
construct the nation and justify state integrity in the face of resurging Catalan and 
Scottish demands for self-determination and independence. While in each case 
there is a plurality of conceptions of the state, in Spain the demos is 
predominantly defined as a single, indivisible nation of equal citizens while in the 
UK the focus is typically on a plurinational Union. This, we contend, shapes the 
arguments made in favor of state unity. The dominant case for state integrity in 
Spain is more negative, focused primarily on the unconstitutionality of 
independence and delegitimizing the independence agenda. In the UK, the 
predominant appeal to the Union is more positive and instrumental: as the 
country is perceived as a partnership entered into willingly, a case must be made 
for its continuation. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of state 
nationalism and political dynamics in plurinational states by shedding light on the 
ways in which party elites understand and legitimize the state at moments of 
profound internal challenge. 
Keywords: majority nationalism; unionism; self-determination; state unity; 
territorial integrity; elite discourse; Scotland; Catalonia 
Introduction 
How do party elites construct the nation and justify state integrity in the face of 
challenges from below? This article examines this question in Spain and the United 
Kingdom, two paradigmatic cases of state nationalism rearticulating and becoming 
explicit in the midst of constitutional crises due to persistent Catalan demands for self-
determination and the process of Brexit, which has destabilized the foundation of the 
UK devolution arrangement and, crucially, reignited the Scottish independence debate.  
This article is motivated by the paradox that, while all state nationalisms 
presumably have an interest in the protection of state unity, British and Spanish state 
actors adopt markedly different discursive strategies. We compare and contrast state 
nationalist claims between, and within, the two cases. Drawing on the influential view 
that nationalism is a claim-making process1, we are concerned here with state 
nationalism as a form of political rhetoric by party elites making the case for state 
integrity.  
We examine the arguments of political parties which have actively engaged in 
the debate over independence from 2014 to 2018 in the Spanish case and 2015 to 2019 
in the British case, pivotal periods in each. We capture arguments through the thematic 
analysis of key parliamentary and public debates along the conception of the nation; the 
claim to sovereignty; and the territorial integrity of the state. In Spain, we include the 
Partido Popular, Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Unidas Podemos, and Ciudadanos. 
We exclude VOX from consideration, as while it has actively engaged in the Catalan 
debate, it did not receive parliamentary representation in Madrid until April 2019. In the 
United Kingdom, we include the parties which campaigned under the mantle of Better 
Together in 2014: the Conservative and Unionist Party, the Labour Party, and the 
Liberal Democrats. Although other views exist within each political party, these extracts 
reflect the dominant view within each.  
Our primary argument is that the ways in which each party understands the 
nation shapes its approach to their respective challenges from below. While we identify 
a plurality of understandings of the nation in the two places, in Spain the demos is 
predominantly defined as a single, indivisible nation of equal citizens while in the UK 
the focus is typically on a plurinational Union. We suggest that this key difference 
facilitates the articulation of different claims about state unity. In Spain, the dominant 
arguments against independence focus on legal considerations - the unconstitutionality 
of independence - and normative claims associating independence with anti-
Europeanism, borders, and conflict. This coexists with a growing frame of Spain in 
more positive terms, a common project that needs strengthening. In the UK, the 
predominant appeal to the Union is more positive and instrumental: as the country is 
perceived as a partnership entered into willingly, a case must be made for its 
continuation.  
This article aims to contribute to the understanding of state nationalism as 
concept and its role and implications in the specific British and Spanish constitutional 
tensions. While significant attention has been recently paid to comparing the case for 
independence and the dynamics of the Catalan and Scottish movements2, the 
perspective of the Spanish and British states has received less attention.3  
This article is structured as follows. We first examine the dominant 
contemporary conceptions of nation and union in Spain and the United Kingdom, which 
constitute the ideational offer available to state party elites when articulating discourses 
of state unity. We then move onto the empirical section, examining and comparing 
conceptions of the nation, self-determination, and arguments in favor of the political 
union in each case. We finally draw out the key conclusions from the comparison and 
suggest more general lessons about calls for state unity in the face of challenges from 
below. 
Contemporary Conceptions of Nation and Union in Spain and the UK  
The dominant form of contemporary Spanish nationalism is constitutionalism, or 
the vindication of the 1978 Constitution as the legitimate basis for maintaining political 
order and unity in Spain. After the delegitimization of Spanish nationalism due to its 
symbolic and discursive appropriation by the Franco regime, the focus on the 
Constitution gave a democratic content to what was still presented as a previously 
existing nation.4 The Constitution became both a catalyst and a symbol of the 
democratic rearticulation of Spanish nationalism. State-wide Spanish parties define 
themselves as constitutionalists –or, less frequently, as constitutional patriots– and 
engage in meaning negotiation as to what precepts are most fundamental to the 
constitutional order. Successive Spanish governments have jealously defended the 
declarations about the unitary Spanish nation in the constitution, which also recognizes 
the right to self-government of nationalities and regions and includes references to the 
peoples of Spain in the preamble. 
While Spanish party elites ground their arguments in the Constitution, their 
British counterparts lack an official state ideology, instead engaging with a variety of 
concepts – Britishness and British identity, the plurinational British state, and unionism. 
We focus here on understandings of Unionism, as they relate to the case for the 
maintenance of state integrity.5 Unionism is internally diverse and a polyvalent and 
elusive concept referring variously “to constitutional practice, to legal doctrine and to 
ideology, serving the common purpose of combining unity with varying degrees of 
recognition of difference”.6 Unionism can be understood as “constructive”, with a focus 
on the creation or furtherance of a common project between the constituent nations of 
the United Kingdom.7  
This brings us to the ways in which Spanish and British political elites 
understand the nature of their respective nation – whether predominantly mononational 
or plurinational. In the Constitution, the Spanish nation is understood as a group of 
citizens as opposed to the sum of different peoples or nations, and the only subject of 
constituent power.8 As a single national entity, Spain is considered to be indivisible and 
the successive Spanish governments have refused to entertain ideas about shared 
sovereignty. This is similar in the UK, where central governments refuse to give up the 
doctrine that sovereignty lies in the Westminster Parliament, which can therefore 
prevail in any conflict. The difference is that the United Kingdom is viewed as 
plurinational, encompassing what Colley describes as “four nation Britishness”.9 
Unionist political elites reject secession but recognize a right of Scotland to determine 
its own future and become independent if it so wills.  
Within each case, there is internal variation embodied by the political parties. 
Contemporary Spanish nationalism takes multiple forms, as outlined by Núñez Seixas.10 
On the right, we can identify the democratic right (and a regionalist strand within this) 
and the late-national Catholicism whilst on the left we find the social-democratic 
strand and the leftist-strand. In the United Kingdom, we find multiple forms of 
unionism, although less clearly defined than the Spanish state. They range from a more 
unitary to a more federal understanding of the Union, with all embracing devolution 
from 1999 onward.11  
Firstly, the dominant strand of conservative Spanish nationalism is the 
democratic right, currently articulated by the Partido Popular (PP) and Ciudadanos 
(C’s) and previously by the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), the coalition of 
Francoist reformists, liberals, Christian-democrats and regionalists that led the transition 
to democracy between 1977 and 1981. This strand, whose parties emphasize and draw 
support on the issue of state unity, adopts the vocabulary of liberalism and individual 
rights and stresses the role of the Constitution in guaranteeing freedom vis-à-vis the 
perceived excesses of sub-state nationalists’ policies, most notably on language.12 In 
fact, Ciudadanos emerged in 2006 as “non-nationalist” Catalan party opposed to 
Catalan linguistic and nationalist policies which later became a state-wide party focused 
on national unity.13 
The democratic right also places a strong emphasis on historical narratives 
elaborated by traditionalist history writers to reinforce the idea that Spain is an ancient 
nation and to redress hitherto dominant pessimistic visions of Spain as a “mater 
dolorosa”14 - backwards, decadent, internally unstable and internationally absent. The 
last government of the Partido Popular led by José María Aznar (2000-2004) promoted 
the most explicit form of constitutionalism, a Spanish adaptation of Jurgen Habermas’ 
constitutional patriotism which did not seek to refound the nation along anti-fascist 
consensus and was not based on citizenship-based universal civic principles but, rather, 
a shared Spanish culture and identity.  
Secondly, late-national Catholicism is characterized by the quasi-mystical 
identification between Spain and Catholicism and the defense of the unity of the 
“patria”, deploying a strong “anti-separatist” character. It is a small and fragmented 
strand articulated by parties such as Fuerza Nueva, Frente Nacional, Falange Española 
and, most recently, VOX, which obtained 52 seats in the November 2019 Spanish 
election after making a first appearance in April 2019 with 23 seats. VOX, however, fits 
imperfectly in this category due to its focus on nativism rather than Catholic 
traditions.15 
Thirdly, the dominant discourse in the Spanish left, the social-democratic strand 
articulated by the Socialist party (PSOE), has contributed to the democratization of the 
Spanish national project through a “patriotic” rhetoric that emphasizes the “plural” 
character of Spain, modernity, inter-regional solidarity, and a pro-European outlook.16 
In the 1960s and 70s, the PSOE defended the right to self-determination for 
“nationalities and regionalities” and the creation of a “republican federation of Iberian 
nationalities”. In the Spanish election of 1977, and especially after the failed coup d’état 
of 1981, however, Spain became the PSOE’s national frame of reference and an 
emphasis was placed on the idea of “a nation of nations”, under the intellectual 
influence of Anselmo Carretero Jiménez. In the 1980s, the distinction between political 
and civic nations emerged: Spain is a political nation encompassing cultural nations 
which are not entitled to sovereignty, drawing on a venerable distinction that goes back 
to Friedrich Meinecke’s Staatsnation and Kulturnation17 applied to the Spanish context 
by the political scientist Andrés de Blas. 
This pluricultural project was rebranded “a plural Spain” in the early 2000s and 
especially during José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s first term (2004-2008). The core idea 
was that of a nation proud of its linguistic and cultural diversity; a plurality of identities 
coexisting within, and being loyal to, a common project, with echoes of José Ortega i 
Gasset’s ethno-civic view of Spain.18 The PSOE embraces decentralization, with 
divisions between those who defend symmetric and asymmetric forms. A dominant 
view within the party is that “patriotism” is a precondition for solidarity and social 
justice: a strong state is necessary vis-à-vis conservative forces and sub-state 
nationalisms, which are portrayed at times as disloyal and unsupportive (“insolidarios”) 
instruments of the local bourgeoisie.19 
Finally, there is a minority position, the leftist strand, currently articulated by the 
coalition Unidas Podemos (and in the past by Izquierda Unida, now under this coalition) 
which contends that Spain is plurinational and that minority nations are distinct peoples 
with the right to self-determination while offering a collective project for the whole 
state community. There are internal tensions between the classic Spanish left and a 
populist strand influenced by Laclau and Mouffle, but this political space has gradually 
moved closer to the first stance and typically deploys an explicitly patriotic discourse 
focused on the protection of social and political rights. Importantly, there is within this 
strand of Spanish nationalism a conceptual tension between the singularization of the 
people (el pueblo) and the view that there are different nations within Spain. 
Unlike in Spain, issues pertaining to Scotland’s place in the Union are rarely a 
matter of party contestation at the state-wide level in the UK. The three main parties 
concur on a plurinational conception of the British state and a relatively flexible form of 
Britishness, position themselves positively on devolution, and are open to further 
manifestations of decentralization whilst registering their opposition to Scottish 
independence. However, there is variation when we examine their precise 
understanding of the Union.  
First, there is a more unitary understanding of the Union, historically and 
contemporaneously articulated by the Conservative and Unionist Party, for whom 
Unionism, in the form of opposition to Irish Home Rule, was part of its defining ethos.20 
Conservatives drew upon a Burkean understanding of “respect for the wisdom of ages”, 
a focus on the historic Union and respect for these traditions.21 Unionist ideals 
referenced the Anglo-Irish Union, the British Empire, and the Anglo-Scottish Union.22 
The nation and the Union are presented as intrinsically linked: “for much of the last 
three centuries, belief in nation was synonymous with a belief in the Union”.23  
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) adopted a highly unitary 
understanding of the British state, with Thatcher suggesting that Scottish independence 
was preferable to devolution, as independence would leave parliamentary sovereignty 
untouched. Lynch describes the 1997 general election as the “nadir for Conservative 
unionism”, with the party campaigning against devolution in Scotland and Wales.24 
Since 1999, the party has embraced devolution and, as a party of government at the 
center, accommodated the Scottish Government’s request to transfer the competences to 
hold an independence referendum in 2014. However, recent research suggests an 
increasingly assertive approach to the Union, termed by Kenny and Sheldon as “hyper 
unionism’.25 This represents a break with previous positions of the party, which were 
more subtle, and the unionism within the leadership of the Conservative Party has taken 
on a more “urgent and strident character”.26  
Second, there is a more ambivalent form of welfare unionism articulated by the 
Labour Party which emphasizes the instrumental importance of the Union in providing 
for a welfare state.27 The Labour Party’s engagement with themes of both Britishness 
and Union have been episodic throughout its history and underpinned by an ideology 
which has at points viewed nationalism, both British and Scottish, as incompatible with 
broader socialist values.28 History plays a minimal role in their unionism, although the 
Labour history of the United Kingdom is one of progress and democratic and social 
innovation, detached from the glory days of Empire and instead embedded within the 
democratic principles and institutions of the modern British state.29 For example, under 
Gordon Brown (2007-2010), the welfare state, and in particular the NHS, was to 
symbolize “the essential character of Britishness” as were policies to allow for 
redistribution between the richer and poorer regions of the United Kingdom.30 Kenny 
characterizes this as a progressive and “even post-national form of nationhood”.31 New 
Labour sought “to wrap itself in the Union flag in part to establish its own centrist 
political credentials, and also to head off the traditional Conservative argument that it 
could not be trusted with the country’s national interest”.32 Gordon Brown described his 
vision of Britain as “multiethnic and multinational”: “I understand Britishness as being 
outward looking, open, internationalist with a commitment to democracy and 
tolerance”.33  His charge was picked up by Ed Miliband as leader, in the form of the 
One Nation narrative, but it was a broad one, designed to address immigration, 
diversity, and the English question in addition to the plurinational British state.34  
Third, there is a federal unionism espoused by the Liberal Democrats which 
offers limited engagement with debates on Union and Britishness. The party positions 
itself against nationalism (whether in its British or Scottish guises) although in practice 
it supports attachment to the United Kingdom. The Liberal Democrats also argue for the 
exercise of popular sovereignty, with sovereignty vested in the people of the United 
Kingdom rather than in Parliament, unlike most of its Labour and Conservative 
counterparts.35 The party focuses on the maintenance of two Unions, Scotland within 
the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom within the European Union, and draws 
parallels between Scottish and Britishness nationalism as equally divisive.36 
Having examined contemporary conceptions of nation and union in Spain and 
the United Kingdom, we now turn towards how they manifest in state-wide parties’ 
political discourse when confronted with Catalan and Scottish self-determination 
demands. 
Debating Union and Separation From the State 
Who Are We? The Nation(s) within the State 
Spanish and British party elites demonstrate different understandings of the demos. The 
dominant discourse of Spanish parties regarding the political community emphasizes 
two core ideas, single sovereignty and equality among Spaniards, which are interrelated 
through the view of Spain as mononational. This is in sharp contrast to the position of 
British party elites, which recognize and accept the plurinational nature of the British 
state, with sub-state identities nested under a broader British identity. The articulation of 
Union and the embodiment of sovereignty within parliament, rather than sitting with the 
people, shapes the understanding of the internal nationalist challenge.  
In Spain, the core argument is that of single and indivisible sovereignty. This 
view is shared across the political spectrum but, as suggested in the previous section, 
there is variation along ideological lines in terms of saliency and the precise articulation 
of the argument. “In Spain there is no conflict of sovereignties because there is only one 
sovereignty, that of 47 million Spaniards”, in the words of a then-PP MP.37 Former PP 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy provided the following response in 2014 when a 
delegation of the Catalan Parliament requested the competence to hold an independence 
referendum to the Spanish Congress: 
The sovereignty of the people, Spanish sovereignty, belongs to all Spaniards, all of 
them. There are no regional, provincial or local sovereignties; they don’t exist, they 
can’t be created, and they could not be accepted, at least not under our current 
Constitution. (…) Neither this Government, nor the Parliament, nor the Catalan 
Parliament, nobody, can legitimately and unilaterally deprive the whole of the 
Spanish people, the only subject of sovereignty, from its right to decide its 
collective future. (…) I do not have the right, as a Galician, to decide about the 
future of Galicia ignoring the rest of Spaniards. (…) One part cannot decide for the 
whole thing.38 
The last two sentences capture the core notion of equality among Spaniards and the 
view of Spain as mononational. The argument about equality is the logical consequence 
of the defence of single sovereignty: it is because sovereignty belongs to the whole of 
Spanish citizens that they must be the ones taking the decision on self-determination. 
The equality argument is framed by Ciudadanos, a party belonging to the democratic 
right which also draws on a civic vocabulary characteristic of the social-democratic 
strand, as part of their view of Spain as a common project. For Albert Rivera, then-
leader of Ciudadanos: 
All Spaniards are equal against the law and we all decide about our country – not 
territories, Autonomous Communities, provinces, but all of us, as the most 
advanced nations in the world do (…) Equality and union are unnegotiable (…) We 
stand against those who want to do a coup d’état against the Constitution, infringe 
the rules of the game, and undermine the equality and the fundamental rights of all 
Spaniards, including Catalans.39 
While all conservative parties share the mononational view of Spain, we may 
distinguish between organicist and civic forms. The organicist view, articulated by 
VOX and by some PP and C’s MPs, stresses that “the idea of Spain without Catalonia is 
unbearable, unthinkable, a mutilation”.40 A more common view is that shared 
nationhood grounds democracy and the Spanish civic project. This is a core principle of 
liberal nationalism, a strand of liberal political theory that stresses the importance of 
membership to national groups for individuals which has both state-focused41 and 
minority-focused42 approaches. The current PP leader Pablo Casado delivered a lecture 
in 2019 in which he sought to make a liberal nationalist case for Spain: 
Democracies find their ground in national loyalty. A common framework is 
necessary even to have a discussion. It’s impossible to play chess without a board, 
to play football without a pitch, to play tennis without a court. For the same reason, 
it is impossible to do democratic politics without a nation and for this reason the 
Constitution is based on the unity of the nation. It is national loyalty, what we call 
patriotism, which allows for concord without the need for agreement.43 
This idea is present but implicit in the social-democratic strand of Spanish nationalism 
articulated by the Socialists. The main difference between them and right-wing parties 
is that, while the Socialists agree on a single Spanish sovereignty, they place an 
emphasis on diversity and occasionally reference the “peoples of Spain”, “the Catalan 
people” and even “the national aspirations of Catalonia”. In June 2017, the PSOE 
affirmed in its party congress the plurinational character of the state, under the influence 
of the Catalan Socialists (PSC) as well as Galician and Valencian socialists to a lesser 
degree, but crucially added that sovereignty lies in the Spanish people as a whole and 
continues to oppose a Catalan referendum.44 Consider the following statement by 
Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, leader of the PSOE when the delegation of the Catalan 
Parliament requested the competence to hold an independence referendum to the 
Spanish Congress in 2014: 
We the Socialists fight for equality: for equal opportunities and equal rights, and 
we respect all, absolutely all, identities. We are socialists, we are not nationalists. 
(…) In our model of Spain, the one we have defended since our Constitution was 
born, everybody can feel comfortable with her own identity. For this reason, we 
don’t like projects forcing people to choose between being Catalan and being 
Spanish.45 
Alongside the equal sovereignty argument, the emphasis on diversity and shared 
belonging underpins most of the Socialists’ discourse on the nation. In 2016, party 
leader Pedro Sánchez argued that “Spain is much more than a territory. Spain is much 
more than a geographical space in the world. Especially for the Socialists, Spain is an 
idea of equality, fraternity and freedom, a way of living together in our diversity”.46 
This refers to a plurality of linguistic, cultural and national identities. Since Pedro 
Sánchez became Prime Minister in 2018, the emphasis on a plurality of identities has 
been increasingly used to reframe the political dispute as one within Catalonia, rather 
than between Catalonia and Spain. Sánchez has continuously argued that “the Catalan 
people, rather than one people, are peoples with multiple identities”.47 
The leftist coalition Unidas Podemos is the only state-wide political force 
arguing that Spain is plurinational and that Catalans are a distinct people with the “right 
to decide” their political future in a referendum.48 The party has sought to adapt the 
vocabulary of patriotism along plurinational and social lines. The party leader Pablo 
Iglesias has referred to Spain as a “plurinational homeland” and “a country of countries” 
while claiming that “there is a new Spain that wants our country to respect national 
diversity and articulate institutional and democratic mechanisms to allow for such 
recognition”.49 
In contrast to the predominantly mononational conception of the Spanish state, 
UK political elites acknowledge the plurinational nature of the state and use the Union 
as the main point of reference. Largely absent from this discussion, and notable in 
comparison with the Spanish case, is any meaningful discussion of sovereignty. 
Speaking on the Union, then-Prime Minister Theresa May explained: 
The accommodation of multiple, layered identities within a common system of 
values is one of the UK’s greatest assets. It is a hallmark of what it is to be British 
and it is a defining strength of our Union.50 
One can, in the words of Theresa May, “support a football team representing one of the 
UK nations and cheer on Team GB at the Olympics, and feel that there is nothing 
incoherent about it”.51 Labour MP Martin Whitfield described the Union “made 
stronger by the diversity of its communities and constituent parts rather than creeping 
uniformity”.52 The parties draw a distinction between sub-state national identity and 
sub-state nationalism, the former to be welcomed and embraced, the latter a threat to the 
unity of the British state.53 Britishness is framed as another, higher, level of identity to 
that of the sub-state nations:  
Each of us is proud of our distinct history and culture and our different traditions. 
Although our distinct identities are proudly held, perhaps particularly when we are 
watching sport, there is another set of values and ideas that unite us all, from 
Coleraine to Colchester and from Campbelltown to Caernarfon. The values of 
tolerance, democracy, equality and fairness are central to who we are as citizens of 
the United Kingdom.54 
In debates that took place in the House of Commons about the Union, the strains of the 
Scottish independence referendum and the process of Brexit, the Union was generally 
defined by parties across the divide as something to be valued, maintained and 
strengthened. It was strengthened as a result of its plurinational nature and the fact that 
it was a union entered into willingly and to the benefit of all.55 The Union was also 
framed as a living thing, capable of accommodating the needs and demands of the 
constituent nations of the United Kingdom. Conservative MP John Lamont explained: 
“The Union has evolved organically, with no written constitution at its heart, so it lacks 
the texts and the formalities that define other nations, but I stress this is a good thing”56. 
Theresa May returned to these themes, describing the Union as the “modern, 21st 
century relationship” both “durable and flexible”.57  
It is our contention in this piece that these dominant understandings of the state 
in the respective cases, as a single nation in the Spain and a flexible and plurinational 
Union in the UK, shape political parties’ discourse on self-determination demands and 
independence.  
A Right to Decide? Self-Determination Viewed from the Centre 
Spanish and British party elites frame the right to self-determination differently, with 
Spanish elites viewing referendums on self-government as unconstitutional and the right 
to self-determination as inapplicable in Catalonia while UK political elites affirm 
Scotland’s right to self-determination but argue that 2014 served as an exercise of this 
right which should not be revisited in the near term.  
Facing demands for a Catalan referendum which are typically grounded on 
democratic arguments, the dominant argument by state-wide Spanish parties equates 
law-enforcement with democracy. Indeed, the former Spanish Vice-President Soraya 
Sáenz de Santamaría (PP) repeatedly argued that there is no democracy beyond the 
law58, while the current Vice-President Carmen Calvo (PSOE) has made it clear that 
“we cannot talk about what is not legal”.59 The framing of the argument in legalistic 
terms is facilitated by the fact that the Constitution codifies that “the Spanish people” 
are the subject of sovereignty (art. 1.2), establishes that the state is “based on the 
indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all 
Spaniards” (art. 2), and states that referendums can only be called by the central 
government in Madrid. The Constitution is thus instrumental to demarcate valid issues 
in the political agenda: given that the text is presented as the very symbol of democracy, 
demands outside the Constitution may be deemed unacceptable. 
In addition to sitting outside the Spanish constitutional framework, Spanish 
politicians argue that the right to self-determination does not apply because Spain is a 
democracy and Catalonia is not a colony. The Secretary of State of Global Spain, 
created by the PSOE in 2018 to improve the international image of Spain, states in the 
report Information about the Catalan independence bid that the Spanish constitution is 
“just like all other constitutions in Western nations”60 in that it does not recognize self-
determination. With regard to the 2017 Catalan independence referendum, Global Spain 
argues that “there is no right to participate in a voting process which has been declared 
illegal by the Constitutional Court”.61 Politicians have argued that self-determination “is 
not democratic, is not a right, it is just the negation of everybody else’s rights”, drawing 
on the notion of a single and equal Spanish sovereignty highlighted above.62 
This is in contrast to the approach of UK politicians who have, since devolution, 
affirmed the right to self-determination despite opposing independence.63 Speaking of 
the Union, Prime Minister Theresa May reiterated that the Union is a partnership 
requiring the consent of the constituent nations: 
[O]ur Union rests on and is defined by the support of its people. It is not held 
together by a rigid constitution or by trying to stifle criticisms of it. It will endure 
as long as people want it to – for as long as it enjoys the popular support of the 
‘zpeople of Scotland and Wales, England and Northern Ireland.64 
In a debate instigated by the SNP on the Claim of Right for Scotland, unionist parties 
across the political spectrum affirmed Scotland’s right to decide its own future.65 
Douglas Ross MP stated: “The claim of right is very clear and we all support it. It says 
the Scottish people are sovereign and can choose the Parliament that best suits their 
needs”.66  However, this argument was caveated: whilst Scotland had a right to self-
determination, the consent of the UK Government would be required for any future 
referendum and this consent would not be forthcoming, a matter of contestation in the 
General Elections of 2017 and 2019.   
Indeed, Theresa May famously responded to calls for another referendum after 
the 2016 Brexit vote with “Now is not the time”.67 This argument was employed with 
notable consistency by all three Unionist parties. Scotland, unionists argue, has a right 
to decide its own future, and it did so in 2014, opting to remain within the United 
Kingdom. Then Secretary of State for Scotland, David Mundell explained: “the people 
of Scotland exercised their right to choose their future in 2014. They were very clear 
that they wished to remain in the United Kingdom”.68 Scottish MP Ian Murray 
described this in terms of sovereignty, which the Labour Party stressed its support of: 
“The sovereign will of the Scottish people was to deliver a Scottish Parliament and stay 
in the United Kingdom”.69 Christine Jardine of the Liberal Democrats argued in favor of 
the principle while arguing that it had been exercised: “although we would all agree that 
no nation can be held in a union against its will, the expressed will of the Scottish 
people was that they would stay within the Union”.70  
Like their Spanish counterparts, British politicians argue that a referendum 
would be divisive.  The SNP is described as single-minded “obsessed with another 
referendum against the wishes of a clear majority of Scots”.71 Instead, if Scots wished to 
express their preference, they could do so at the ballot box. Scottish Labour MP Ian 
Murray, in the debate over the Claim of Right, argued: 
I simply say, on the sovereign will of the Scottish people and the convention, that it 
is written down. It is being delivered. It has been delivered and everything that will 
be delivered in the future, in terms of the sovereign will of the Scottish people, will 
happen at the ballot box when the people of Scotland go to vote.72 
This framing allows parties to argue that they respect Scotland’s right to self-
determination whilst also rebuffing calls for a second independence referendum. While 
differences of opinion on the prospect of a second referendum exist within and between 
the three parties, this is a common thread to unionist parties’ discourse. 
Why Stay Together? The Case for State Unity 
Party elites in both the UK and Spain make combined claims against independence and 
for state unity. However, there is strong variation in the balance between negative and 
positive arguments, and in the content of these arguments. In Spain, the discourse 
focuses overwhelmingly on the negative framing of independence and the centrality of 
the Constitution, although there is growing recognition within the social-democratic and 
leftist strands of the need for a more appealing state project. In contrast, while British 
party elites also view independence negatively and emphasize similar issues around risk 
and division, they adopt a comparatively more positive and developed case for the 
Union, avoiding broad principles and focusing instead on pragmatic benefits. British 
party elites are more practiced, having learned from the 2014 referendum experience, in 
which the unionist campaign Better Together stressed the risks and uncertainties of 
independence, and unionist politicians speak of shared history, shared institutions, and a 
common future.73   
Indeed, in Spain, the delegitimising of independence and the fetishisization of 
the 1978 Constitution characterize Spanish parties’ political discourse. The language is 
more assertive than in the UK, especially that of the conservative parties, and the 
Catalan self-determination demand is framed as a “challenge”, a “provocation”, a 
“stand”, a “project of rupture”, and a “threat”, while independence supporters are “those 
who want to break-up Spain”, “liquidate the Constitution”, or “dissolve the nation”. 
With the Constitution grounding Spanish democracy and justifying the impossibility of 
a Catalan referendum, Spanish parties self-describe as “constitutionalist forces”, 
replacing but not completely removing the hitherto dominant “patriotic” label, and 
present the Constitution as a symbol of compromise, democracy, modernity and 
harmony.  
The discursive emphasis is on undermining the legitimacy of the independence 
cause and movement. For then-leader of Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera, the movement 
represents “the poison of Europe, which is nationalism” and a “challenge to Spain as a 
common national project” because it “defies democracy”.74 According to Pedro 
Sánchez, the Catalan independence movement is a backwards project because “it goes 
against history”, seeking separation and new borders, and illegitimate, because it does 
not have a social majority of Catalans behind it and “excludes” or even “silences” “the 
non-nationalist part of Catalonia”. For all these reasons, Catalan independence would be 
like Brexit: 
Catalan independentism undermines the European project because it contests 
Spain’s collective project. The strength of the [European] Union is grounded on its 
integration, never its segregation. (…) Both Brexit and the Catalan independentist 
movement walk along parallel ways and similar rhetoric. Both create a narrative of 
invented and exaggerated grievances. Both want to force the population to make a 
binary decision (…) Both blame a third party.75 
This goes in hand with an emphasis on the dire consequences of independence itself. 
For Mariano Rajoy, an independent Catalonia would be “as close as it gets to Robinson 
Crusoe’s island” because Catalonia “would be poorer, would leave Europe sine die, 
would leave the Euro, the UN and international treaties”.76  
Within appeals to the Constitution, we may distinguish between a static 
conception of the text defended by the PP and C’s and a more dynamic view defended 
by the PSOE. The former stress the Constitution as a guarantee for unity and equality 
and present their interpretation, focused on precepts of state unity and a single 
sovereignty, as the valid version. Insofar as the Catalan issue is about law-abidance and 
the valid answer to Catalan demands lies in protecting the Constitution, these parties do 
not feel compelled to articulate a clear case for staying together. Differently, the PSOE 
and Unidas Podemos often stress the constitutional precepts around autonomy and 
recognize the need to provide a political solution to the “territorial crisis”. A contrast is 
also established between their “social patriotism” and the “standardizing patriotism” of 
the conservative parties.77 While explicit calls to “patriotism” are less common than 
anticipated, the view of Spain as a civic union and a common project is increasingly 
voiced: “a project of conviviality, recovering rights and reconstructing the welfare state 
after years of austerity”, in the words of Pedro Sánchez.78  
This is connected to a growing, yet underdeveloped strand of arguments which 
focuses on a more positive case for state unity, or at least the need for one. Even if 
independence is deemed impossible under the Spanish constitution, there is a growing 
recognition that the situation requires a rearticulation of the Spanish national project. 
Pedro Sánchez’s views are the following: 
The situation in Catalonia requires the strengthening of our common project, of 
Spain. I think that, in order to fight against independentism, to fight against 
pressures of territorial fragmentation, what we have to do is to articulate a common 
project for our country. A plural Spain which recognizes itself in diversity and also 
defends equality among citizens.79 
Meritxell Batet, then-Socialist MP and current speaker of the Spanish Cortes, sought to 
specify what this reformist agenda could look like:  
The solution to the territorial problems, the best way to defend the union between 
all citizens, is to build a better Spain –to build a country that recognizes its  
diversity sincerely and proudly; invests in education and health care; democratizes 
the institutions; generates welfare; defends all Spanish languages as a richness of 
its own; has a project for the country that clarifies the distribution of competences 
to avoid the current levels of conflict; reforms the Senate so that Autonomous 
Communities feel represented and participate actively in a common project and 
common governance; and has a fairer funding system.80 
The leftist strand of Spanishness of Unidas Podemos attempt to position themselves as a 
different and more moderate voice. For the party leader Pablo Iglesias 
We need to accept with composure that discussing the territorial question in Spain 
means discussing a historical matter which has been present every time a 
democratic period started in our country. The territorial crisis is something 
common in our history and we probably should accept it more naturally and with a 
more constructive spirit.81  
Within the PP, there is also more positive element based on generic historicist claims 
about centuries of unity and universal values condensed in the Constitution, in the 
absence of a consensual view about the turbulent contemporary history of Spain. In the 
words of Mariano Rajoy: “I see centuries of shared history; centuries of shared union; 
generations of Spaniards united in a common destiny, in hopes, success, difficulties, and 
also in differences”.82 The fight against ETA is also mobilized as a source of state 
legitimacy, which is a difference with the UK, where the memory of terrorism from the 
IRA is largely absent from unionist claims at the center. 
In contrast to the Spanish case, where attention to the positive case for state 
unity was comparatively minimal, British political elites across the political spectrum 
set out plans for the reform and reinvigoration of the Union. In a speech made shortly 
before she left office, Prime Minister Theresa May explained: 
We need to work more cleverly, more creatively and more coherently as a UK 
Government fully committed to a modern, 21st century Union in the context of a 
stable and permanent devolution settlement to strengthen the glue that holds our 
Union together.83 
As he took over as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson spoke to his ambitions for a 
strengthened Union outside of the European Union, saying “Our constitutional 
settlement, our United Kingdom, will be firm and secure; our Union of nations beyond 
question; our democracy robust; our future clean, green, prosperous, united, confident 
and ambitious”.84 
The Union is presented as a common British project which benefits Scotland in 
three ways. Firstly, the Union is a shared project, with historical and contemporaneous 
achievements, most notably the defeat of fascism and the development of the welfare 
state, an argument made by all three Unionist parties. Secondly, found among Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats, the union was one of solidarity, allowing for the sharing of 
risks and resources throughout the United Kingdom. And finally, a Conservative 
argument spoke of the global influence of Scotland within the United Kingdom. We 
examine each in turn. 
Firstly, parties of all colors make reference to the Second World War and the 
collective effort to defeat fascism.85 Gordon Brown described “Scots, English, Welsh 
and Irish forefathers who fought on the battlefields as one – standing together, dying 
together – when our freedoms were threatened in two world wars”86 while Conservative 
MP Stephen Kerr described the global achievements of the United Kingdom, in which 
“The Union between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom has together defeated 
fascism, seen out communism and helped to shape today’s modern world”.87 The 
presence of a consensual and shared “patriotic memory” is a significant difference with 
the Spanish case and allows unionist parties to shift the focus away from the British 
Empire, while in Spain the imperial past and expansion in America are “remembered” 
collectively with pride, as evidenced by the fact that the national day on October 12 
commemorates the anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s first arrival in the Americas.  
The NHS and the welfare state are lauded by all parties as an example of the 
achievements made possible by the Union. British identities and British values are 
understood to be embedded within these shared institutions, despite shifts in their role 
within British society and all pledged further investment in these shared institutions.88 
The second argument, which focuses on the Union as an instrument for sharing 
and pooling risks for the economic and social benefit of all, is employed by Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats. In the Labour Party’s view, the needs of the working classes 
transcend issues of individual nations. The argument in favor of Union is therefore an 
argument for sharing, pooling, and redistribution. In his introduction to the 2015 
Scottish Labour manifesto, then UK Labour leader Ed Miliband defined the union in 
purely functional terms:  
The United Kingdom is a union of pooling and sharing resources and risks. We 
believe that Scotland benefits from being part of the United Kingdom 
economically, financially, socially and culturally.89 
Labour MP Paul Sweeney defined the Union in functionalist terms, illustrating the 
economic benefits in a debate on Strengthening the Union. While he spoke to more 
aspirational motives he also argued: 
If nothing else holds true, Scotland benefits every year from £9 billion that it would 
not otherwise have to invest in the provision of public services that ensure that 
quality of life for people in Scotland is better than it otherwise would be. That is 
equivalent to £1,470 per person in Scotland every year. For as long as that figure is 
correct, there can be no socialist analysis for unpicking and destroying a Union that 
delivers that economic and social benefit for the people of Scotland.90 
This is consistent with the Labour Party’s overall framing of the Union and the state as 
a vehicle for the delivery of economic and social good, an argument that is however 
dependent on them being in power. Implicit in Labour’s argument is that the SNP’s 
independence objective was both narrow, favoring the working class of Scotland over 
the working class throughout the United Kingdom, and fraught with danger, leaving 
Scotland without the economic safety net provided by the United Kingdom, a remnant 
of the 2014 independence debate in which Better Together stressed the risk of economic 
shocks.91 
The Liberal Democratic argument for the Union was developed along similar 
lines but with reference to both the United Kingdom and the European Union. Jo 
Swinson drew parallels between the two: 
Our economy is more successful and our influence is greater. We can pool risks. 
Our businesses benefit from selling to a larger market, without barriers. We share 
values. We share our history. We share a desire for our loved ones in different parts 
of the country to be able to live, work and travel where they want with ease.92 
Notions of sharing are largely absent from the discourse of the Conservative Party, with 
the notable exception of Theresa May’s final speech as Prime Minister, when she spoke 
of the Union as one of solidarity. She emphasized a common community with a 
common interest, without suggesting the redistributive policies of her Labour 
counterparts:  
At its heart is the principle of solidarity – that we are one people. That we have a 
commons take in each other’s success. That the happiness of someone in Belfast is 
the care and concern of someone in Bolton or Brecon or Bridge of Allan.93 
The final argument made by unionist parties was one exclusive to the Conservative 
party, one which suggests the strength, power, and influence of the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom is continually framed as both bigger and stronger together, able to 
weather the storms of the global economy and assert its influence in the world. Theresa 
May described an “alchemy” present in the Union, allowing the “achievement of 
something greater because our four nations worked together”94 while other 
Conservative colleagues were more pragmatic, speaking of economies of scale, the role 
of the United Kingdom in global institutions and in delivering international aid, and 
industrial and sporting achievements.95 Luke Graham described the advantages of the 
United Kingdom, with an emphasis on current challenges: 
We are looking at a 21st century world: we are racked with challenges from climate 
change to technological developments to international fracture from various 
countries all around the world. Would it not be great if somehow we could look to 
a place that would bring neighbours together, enable us to pool our resources, 
decide how to advance our NHS and our welfare, make sure we get £20 billion 
extra for the NHS, and make sure we forward the cause of science and international 
diplomacy and international aid? We have it: it is this Parliament; it is this United 
Kingdom.96 
This focus on the United Kingdom’s economic, diplomatic, and military might harkens 
back to expressions of the United Kingdom in an imperial age. It also reflects the 
Conservative Government’s desire to position the UK as possessing ties, linkages, and 
influence beyond the European Union, which it was attempting to depart. The implicit 
argument is that an independent Scotland would be weaker and more vulnerable to 
threats, both in economic and political form. 
In addition to setting out the positive case for the union, a negative case is also 
clearly present in the UK. Arguments focus on the SNP, described as “pursuing an 
agenda of separation”.97 The party has “one reason for existing, and that is separation 
and division”.98 All three parties position themselves in opposition to another 
referendum, making instrumental arguments against independence. Independence would 
leave Scots poorer, less secure, cut off from their British friends and family, and less 
influential in the broader world.99  
Unionist parties point to the weak economic case for independence, unanswered 
questions over currency, and the collapse of oil prices as well as the economic dilemmas 
posed by Brexit. Gordon Brown argued that the vision of independence put forth by the 
SNP after the EU referendum was a more extreme, and more damaging one: 
Now they are committed to a wholly separate Scottish pound and to abandon, in a 
quiet, almost furtive way, the UK customs union and single market which has 
given us tariff-free, tension-free trade across the four nations for 300 years and 
prevented what now seems inevitable under independence: a hard border at 
Hadrian’s Wall separating Scotland and England and life reduced to an unending 
battle between us and them.100 
Like in Spain, British unionists argued that independence would create more borders. 
LibDem leader Jo Swinson explained “In this day and age, we should not be putting up 
new borders. We should recognise that we live in an interconnected world. It is much 
easier to tackle our shared problems”.101 Scottish Labour MP Hugh Gaffney described 
his opposition to borders: 
I do not believe in a border at Carlisle, nor in a border at Calais, and I never will. I 
believe in socialism, not nationalism. I believe in the people. I believe in solidarity. 
I believe in sharing and fighting together for a better future for our children and 
grandchildren102.  
For Conservatives, Brexit has to be more cautiously mobilized, but they too reject the 
idea that the EU referendum legitimates another independence vote. Unionist politicians 
are critical of Sturgeon’s calls for another independence referendum, arguing that her 
aims are disingenuous. Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland David Mundell was 
critical of the SNP Government’s position, saying “Unionists like me, who supported 
Remain, are just numbers whose votes can be hijacked and used as a pretext for a 
second independence referendum”.103 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have compared the ways party elites in the UK and Spain debate issues 
of nation, self-determination and unity in response to Catalan and Scottish demands. We 
have identified similarities and differences in the plurality of conceptions of the state 
and arguments for state integrity examined in the two contexts. We place a special 
emphasis on the differences in the case for state unity, which is primarily negative in 
Spain, with self-determination viewed unconstitutional and independence divisive and 
backwards, and more positive in the UK, with the Union seen as the instrument to 
facilitate the success of the four nations of the United Kingdom. 
We contend that this variation in the case for the state unity is shaped by the 
dominant construction of the political “we”, a single nation in Spain and a plurinational 
union in the UK. In other words, we suggest that there is an affinity between national 
recognition and instrumental justifications of the political union, and vice versa. In 
Spain, the widespread view of a single, equal sovereignty across members of the 
Spanish nation facilitates the framing of Catalan demands as a fundamental and 
existential threat and the deployment of a more emotive and reactive vocabulary to 
prevent the “dissolution of the nation”. This is accentuated by the fact that the 
Constitution codifies the view of a single nation and the principle of state unity. As a 
result, self-determination demands may be deemed unconstitutional and articulating a 
compelling case about state maintenance is less necessary. 
Self-determination demands impact the UK state differently, as the political 
“we” is primarily discussed in terms of Union rather than nation. We contend that the 
emotional weight of breaking up a union may be different from breaking up a nation, as 
suggested in statements by party elites arguing that, while they would regret Scotland 
deciding to become independent, it was a legitimate choice to be made by the Scottish 
people. The recognition of different peoples within the state contributes to a more 
dispassionate political debate on these issues, although in the UK national recognition 
coexists uneasily with the view of a single sovereignty lying in Westminster. In fact, the 
national question is not a matter of party competition at the state-wide level in the UK 
to the same degree as in Spain.  
More generally, our findings suggest that party elites find it difficult to articulate 
well-developed cases for state integrity. This is partly due to the fact that it is difficult to 
make the case for something that is already there, but it also reflects the pervasive view 
of states as “natural” and the common-sense, taken-for-granted character of dominant 
state nationalisms. Party elites tend to present their national projects and state 
maintenance as self-evidently desirable. Faced with sub-state nationalism and active 
demands for self-determination, elites in the UK and Spain are forced to legitimize and 
explicate their state projects more forcefully, supplying explicit arguments about the 
union. However, our findings point at the struggles and difficulties to rethink and 
articulate the core beliefs and normative foundations of the Spanish and British national 
projects.  
These dynamics are worthy of further study. The case for state unity will 
continue to be needed as the national question remains unsolved in Spain and the UK. 
Beyond these two paradigmatic plurinational states facing critical challenges from 
below, all states try to nurture the view that the population living within their borders 
form a “people” and seek to preserve their territorial integrity. Yet, we do not know 
enough about how states legitimize their reason for being as they face challenges from 
groups within their borders and from broader global forces. 
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